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CASE DIGEST

This CASE DIGEST provides brief analyses of cases that represent current aspects of triansnational law. The Digest includes cases that establish legal principles and cases that apply established legal principles to
new factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories and
references are given for further research.
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I.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT'S ADOPTION OF POLICY PLACING ABORTION-RELATED RESTRICTIONS ON GRANTS TO

DKT Memorial Fund
Ltd. v. Agency for InternationalDevelopment, 887 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS UPHELD,

Three nongovernmental organizations (NGO), Parivar Seva Sanstha
from India (PSS), Population Services Family Planning Programmes,
Ltd. from England (PSFP), and DKT Memorial Fund Ltd., a United
States NGO (DKT), brought suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. They asked the court to declare that the
Agency for International Development (AID) had not properly implemented new policy limitations announced by the Reagan Administration.
According to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. 2151b(b) (1982),
the United States President is authorized to contribute assistance to foreign population planning. The administrator of AID was delegated the
responsibility of allocating population planning funds. In 1984, at the
United Nation's International Conference on Population in Mexico, the
Reagan Adminisration announced a new family planning policy. This
policy (Mexico City Policy) provided that NGOs may not receive funds
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from the United States if they perform abortions or recommend abortion
as a family planning alternative. Subsequently, AID adopted this policy
by inserting certain restrictive clauses in contracts used by AID for providing grants to NGOs. The policy applies even in cases in which an
NGO uses funds other than those received from AID to promote
abortion.
The plaintiffs alleged that the clauses violate the Foreign Assistance
Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551
(1982), as well as the plaintiffs' first amendment rights of freedom of
speech and association. The district court held that the plaintiffs lacked
standing and dismissed the case. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia reversed and allowed the plaintiffs to amend
the complaint directing that there be further proceedings on the issue of
standing and appropriate proceedings for disposition on the merits if the
district court granted standing. The district court denied the foreign
plaintiffs' claims for first amendment protection. The court held, however, that AID's refusal to allow United States NGOs to subgrant to
foreign NGOs based on the new clauses violated DKT's right to freedom
of association.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Held: affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The court affirmed the district court holding on the statutory challenges. The plaintiffs claimed that the Mexico City Policy's funding requirements contradicted the purpose of the Foreign Assistance Act and exceeded the limits
that Congress placed in the Act. The court disagreed, stating that Congress allowed the President the authority to limit funding for foreign
NGOs.
The plaintiffs argued that the clauses violated the APA because they
were arbitrary and capricious. According to the court, the APA was not
violated because the President's power to make policy changes under 22
U.S.C. § 2151b(b) is very broad and because the APA could not be construed to grant the court the authority to review the President's decision.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court decision to deny standing to the foreign NGOs. The court held that because foreign NGOs
were nonresident aliens acting outside the control and supervision of the
United States government, they were not within the zone of interests
protected by the first amendment. According to the court of appeals, the
Reagan Administration's Mexico City Policy as implemented by AID
was simply a refusal to subsidize NGOs' rights of free speech. The court
made clear that even though United States entities had rights to use their
funds in certain ways while receiving government aid, this would not
require treating foreign entities in the same manner.
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The court of appeals reversed the district court decision to allow relief
based on DKT's constitutional claim. DKT claimed that the Mexico
City Policy and the clauses used by AID to implement that policy violated DKT's constitutional right to freedom of association. The clauses
prohibited United States NGOs from subgranting to foreign NGOs who
were ineligible to receive grants directly from AID. According to the
court, AID's adoption of the Mexico City Policy did not affect the right
of DKT to associate but was a refusal to subsidize abortion-related activities carried out during DKT's association with foreign NGOs. The
court reasoned that DKT could still associate with foreign NGOs, but
that it could not subgrant to foreign NGOs who could not receive grants
directly from AID.
The court remanded the case to the district court to dismiss the claim
because DKT presented no claim ripe for adjudication. The court concluded that DKT had not shown that PSS or PSFP discontinued their
association with DKT or would do so in the future. Therefore, DKT
had sustained no injury in fact. Significance-In this decision, the court
upheld the broad authority given to the President under the Foreign Assistance Act to make policy changes affecting the extent to which the
Agency for International Development can dispense funds to foreignbased and United States-based nongovernmental associations.
II.

PATENTS

FEDERAL LONG-ARM STATUTE AUTHORIZES ASSERTION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN HOLDER OF UNITED

STATES

National Patent Development
Corporationv. T. J. Smith & Nephew Ltd., 877 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (en banc).
PATENT IN PATENT OWNERSHIP SUIT,

National Patent Development Corporation (National), a United States
corporation, brought suit for a declaratory judgment against T. J. Smith
& Nephew Ltd., a British corporation, in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia asking the court to declare that National had a one-half ownership interest in several United States patents
reissued in 1985 to Smith & Nephew. National alleged that Smith &
Nephew obtained rights to these patents through fraud, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties. National asked the court to declare
that the patents were held in trust for Hydron, Ltd., a British corporation owned equally by National and another British corporation,
SANACO, and to assign to Hydron "all rights, title, and interest in the
patents."
The district court granted subject matter jurisdiction based on diver-
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sity of citizenship but refused to exercise personal jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 293 (1982) stating that, because the suit was for fraud and
breach of contractual and fiduciary duties, it "was not an 'action respecting, the patent or rights thereunder' within the meaning of section 293."
On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The panel held that personal jurisdiction can be obtained over nonresident patent owners under section
293 if the complaint raises an issue of patent law. According to the
panel, however, because this case involved a disagreement concerning
patent ownership rather than patent law, case precedent required that
the complaint be dismissed.
After a rehearing en banc, the court of appeals, Held: Reversed and
Remanded. According to the court, the language of section 293 "broadly
authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction" over foreign owners of United
States patents in cases "respecting the patent or rights thereunder." The
court held that a suit over patent ownership falls within the natural
meaning of section 293 and that the natural meaning must be conclusive,
absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary. The court
pointed out that state court authority would not be usurped by the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia under the natural meaning interpretation because the federal district court would continue to be constrained by federal subject matter requirements.
The court concluded that a party who takes advantage of the protections granted by registering a patent in the United States, even though
the party resides in a foreign state, should be expected to participate in
legal proceedings concerning that patent in United States courts. Significance-This decision expands the scope of the United States federal
long-arm statute to include personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
owner of a United States patent in a suit over patent ownership.
III.

ANTITRUST

VENUE OVER ALIEN DEFENDANTS IN ANTITRUST SUIT PROPER IN
UNITED STATES FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT UNDER ALIEN

ANY

AcT-Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Electric Co., Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406
(9th Cir. 1989).
VENUE

Go-Video, Inc., a Delaware corporation, whose principal place of business is in Arizona, brought suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona against several foreign electronics manufacturers,
a foreign electronics trade association, various United States motion picture companies, and one United States motion picture trade association
claiming that these groups violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
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U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Go-Video claimed that defendants were involved in a
conspiracy to halt the marketing of dual deck video cassette recorders
(VCR) in the United States and as part of this conspiracy refused to deal
with Go-Video. Go-Video held a United States patent for a "dual deck"
VCR for which it had attempted to purchase parts necessary to its
manufacture.
The plaintiff served the manufacturing defendants under section 12 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1988). Go-Video claimed that because
the manufacturing defendants were alien corporations venue was proper
under the Alien Venue Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1976), which states
that "An alien may be sued in any district." The district court agreed,
holding that it could obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendants on
the basis of the defendants' "national contacts."
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Held: Affirmed. The appellants argued that antitrust plaintiffs who wish
to use the service of process provision in section 12 of the Clayton Act
should also be subject to that section's venue provision because section 12
should be interpreted as an "integrated whole." The appellants reasoned
that the language of section 12 which refers to serving process "in such
cases" should be interpreted to refer to cases in which the section's venue
requirements are met. According to Go-Video, "such cases" should be
interpreted to refer to any case which falls under the phrase "any suit,
action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws . . . ." in section 12.
The court held that process may be served on a defendant in an antitrust case under section 12 of the Clayton Act even though venue is established under the Alien Venue Act rather than under section 12. The
court reasoned that specific venue provisions, such as the provision in
section 12 of the Clayton Act, are not interpreted to preempt, but rather
to supplement, general venue laws such as the Alien Venue Act. The
court also found that the interpretation relied on by Go-Video was more
consistent with the legislative history and better supported by precedent
than the interpretation of the appellants. According to the court, the purposes and language of the Clayton Act support the view that a party
alleging injury should be permitted to bring suit in a greater number of
forums.
In addition, the court held that the district court properly exercised
personal jurisdiction over the appellants. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the worldwide service of process provision in
section 12 authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an alien
corporation in any judicial district, as long as the corporation has sufficient contacts with the United States. The court footnoted to Omni Capi-

tal Int'l v. Rudolph Wolff & Co. 484 U.S. 97 (1987), and Asahi Metal
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Industry v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), identifying that the
United States Supreme court has explicitly declined to decide the constitutionality of national contacts analysis. The court concluded that its use
of national contacts analysis was consistent with the notions of fair play
and substantial justice preserved under the fifth amendment due process
clause. Significance-In this decision, the court made it easier for suits
to be brought against alien defendants under the United States antitrust
laws by construing the Clayton Act to allow venue to be determined by a
broader venue provision in the Alien Venue Act.
IV.

ALIENS AND CITIZENSHIP

INS ORAL NOTICE TO EMPLOYER OF SUSPECTED VIOLATIONS OF
IRCA SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH KNOWLEDGE ELEMENT OF OFFENSE,
Mester ManufacturingCo. v. Immigration and NaturalizationService,
879 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1989).
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) served a Notice of
Intent to Fine (NIF) on Mester Manufacturing Co. (Mester), located in
California and Mexico, charging employment violations of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1986). According to the INS, Mester also committed paperwork violations by failing to
produce certain employee verification forms (1-9) to the INS for review.
At a subsequent hearing requested by Mester, the administrative law
judge (ALJ) issued a cease and desist order for one year and fined
Mester $500.00 for each of six discovered violations.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Held: Affirmed. According to the court, IRCA is a major change in immigration
law and this was the first time a circuit court reviewed the Act's employer sanctions. Under IRCA an employer is forbidden to knowingly
hire or continue to employ an alien whose employment is not authorized
in the United States. If requested, notice and a hearing before an ALJ,
as provided in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982),
must be given to those charged with violating IRCA.
Mester claimed that the IRCA pefialties violated substantive and procedural due process. According to Mester, its right to procedural due
process was denied because it received inadequate notice. The court disagreed, finding that the citation sufficiently informed Mester of the
charges against it. In addition, the court held that Mester's ignorance of
the statute's requirements was no defense and that the company was not
entitled to a full explanation of the alleged violations before enforcement
procedures were implemented.
Mester next claimed that the INS method of notifying Mester violated
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the provisions of the statute. The INS cited only paperwork violations
and notified Mester orally of employment violations. According to the
court, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(i)(2) seems to make the citing of all suspected
violations mandatory. The court, however, held that the INS complied
with the statute because it cited the paperwork violations which were the
only violations that in fact existed on the date of the citation. The court
concluded that the knowledge element of Mester's offense was satisfied
by oral notice of the employment violations and that a determination as
to whether the INS should institute better procedures is a matter of executive discretion.
Significance-In this first review by a United States circuit court of
the employer sanctions under IRCA, the court determined that oral notice by the INS of suspected violations of the statute was sufficient to
satisfy the knowledge element of the offense and did not violate the Constitution's due process guarantees.

